As AI-Driven Security Incidents Become Commonplace, Safety Guidelines Emerge

More organizations are reporting AI-related breaches, but at the same time, the cybersecurity community is developing new frameworks for preventing them.

By Andrew Wig

As AI-Driven Security Incidents Become Commonplace, Safety Guidelines Emerge

More organizations are reporting AI-related breaches, but at the same time, the cybersecurity community is developing new frameworks for preventing them

By Andrew Wig

AI-enabled cyberattacks are normal now.

This much was made clear in IBM’s Cost of a Data Breach 2026 report, which noted more than one in four organizations experiencing a malicious attack between March 2025 and February 2026 reported the offensive was AI-driven. It was a 56% increase over the same survey from the previous year.

 

That data was gathered even before frontier AI models began demonstrating a new level of hacking capabilities that put cybersecurity teams on edge. Organizations are now scrambling to shore up their security postures after witnessing the game-changing cyber capabilities of Anthropic’s Mythos, in addition to high-profile incidents including the OpenAI Hugging Face breach.

The AI Threat Is Here

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One in four organizations that experienced a malicious attack reported it was driven by AI (a 56% increase over 2025)
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85% of organizations plan to increase security spending in response to threats posed by frontier models

$1M

AI-aided attacks added an average of $1 million to the cost of a breach

Numbers like those found in IBM’s recent report are highlighting the reality that a bad configuration can have dire consequences, and heightening enterprises’ need to address weak spots that may have existed for decades. There may have been a time when security teams could have safely ignored such vulnerabilities, comfortable in the knowledge that no human would be able to uncover and exploit them. 

 

That has changed, as OpenAI made clear in its Hugging Face Incident Technical Report:

 

“Agent collectives have proven the ability to find novel vulnerabilities, develop exploits, and find gaps and misconfigurations in security controls with machine speed and comprehensiveness. A misconfiguration, even if an environment is otherwise perfectly configured, may be found and abused by an intelligence collective.”

When Agents Collude

Two agents with narrow privileges can create broader effective authority if one discovers information, another possesses a tool and a third coordinates the work.
—Gleb Tsipursky, CEO, Disaster Avoidance Experts

As part of his work advising organizations on AI adoption, behavioral scientist Gleb Tsipursky has been focusing on the threat that AI agents can pose when they work in teams. Addressing those powers of collaboration, he says, is critical to organizations' AI success.

 

“I help organizations adopt AI for a living, and I want adoption to move faster,” he writes. “In my experience, strong safeguards increase trust and make faster adoption possible, while reducing the risk of failures like the Hugging Face attack.”

 

As enterprises learn to govern their own agents, they are realizing that no agent is an island unto itself. Agents’ ability to enhance their power through collective action, as seen in the Hugging Face incident, must also be factored into any governance framework, Tsipursky argues.

 

“Two agents with narrow privileges can create broader effective authority if one discovers information, another possesses a tool and a third coordinates the work,” he explains. “Security reviews therefore need to test the reachable authority of the group, including what agents can accomplish by combining permissions and sharing context.”

Governing Agents With Authority Maps

As described in the METR/Redwood investigation into the Hugging Face incident, the agents involved in the breach found novel methods of communicating with one another in search of ways out of their sandboxed testing environment. In all, about 1,200 supposedly isolated agents discovered a way to communicate on a makeshift message board, exchanging more than 70,000 messages and files during their breakout and subsequent breach.

 

These collective abilities are why organizations should be adopting an authority map for every production agent, Tsipursky advises. This authority map should answer five questions about each agent: “Which systems can it reach? Which data can it read? Which actions can it execute? Which other agents can it delegate to or receive tasks from? Who can revoke its access immediately?”

 

While industry standards catch up to the technology, organizations don’t have to wait, Tsipursky notes. One way organizations can stay ahead of the curve, he says, is to treat the catalog of tools available to agents as a part of their security perimeter. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is moving in that direction as part of its in-progress AI Agent Standards Initiative, but organizations can adopt those principles before those standards are codified.

 

“The practical sequence is straightforward,” Tsipursky writes. “Expand agent capability in stages. Test single-agent behavior first, then multi-agent coordination. Increase tool authority only after observability and rollback work at the current level. Keep credentials short-lived where possible. Preserve an independent human-controlled stop path. Review the authority map whenever a new MCP tool, agent or delegation path enters production.”

An authority map assigned to each production agent should answer these five questions:

An authority map assigned to each production agent should answer these five questions:
Which systems can it reach?
Which data can it read?
Which actions can it execute?
Which other agents can it delegate to or receive tasks from?
Who can revoke its access immediately?

And just as the tools available to agents should be limited, so should the context, according to Rael Rodning, principal AI ops architect at Evolving Solutions. That’s because an agent may work so hard to fulfill a request that it may draw upon non-relevant data to draw undesired inferences or hallucinations. That risk can be mitigated by limiting an agents’ context window.

 

“If you don't keep your context very tightly grained... it'll draw inferences that you don't want," Rodning warns.

Social Engineering and Old-Fashioned Manipulation

The ability of agents to join forces isn’t the only AI capability that’s keeping cybersecurity teams on their toes.

 

Beyond directly executing attacks, AI tools can help set them up, allowing hackers to gain access through impersonations of real people or forgeries of real interfaces. Long a tried-and-true hacking strategy, social engineering is still a prominent threat.

 

“That's still the number one thing we've seen, is people getting impersonation attacks on them,” says Michael Hannan, chief information security officer at Lightedge, where he addresses security for hybrid workloads across multiple environments including the mainframe.  

 

While social engineering is nothing new, the ability of generative AI tools to create convincing dupes—be it a fake sign-in page, fake voice message or fake video call—has accelerated the pace of such attacks, increasing their odds of finding a human victim during a moment of weakness. 

 

“You may get a Teams message and even someone comes on video … and it feels and looks real,” Hannan says. “ … You want to help somebody and support them super quick. And you may click on something. You may provide some information.”

Reminder: Security Still Revolves Around People

The Critical Human

As AI systems generate code and help protect data from attackers, the human continues to play a critical role:
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Even as advances in AI mean cybersecurity teams have more to worry about, core security principles remain as relevant as ever. “The same things I was meeting with customers 20 years ago, on here's how you prepare, here's how you train, here's how you protect and detect—it's the same things we're still talking about,” Hannan says.

 

Part of that reality is that humans still play a critical role in fending off those attacks. Even in a world where AI security tools can be used for defense as well as offense, the human still bears ultimate responsibility, which means they still need to understand the code that drives everything.

 

“I would not want to be accountable for code that I couldn't validate and vet,” Rodning says. 

 

AI tools can scan for and score vulnerabilities and exposures, but the only way to be entirely confident in that code is to understand it, she says.

 

"You can never blame the machine or the program,” Rodning insists. “It's always the human that's accountable.”
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